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Abstract 
Twentieth-century Afghanistan offers a lesson for the historian of 
comparative economic development. Two conditions help to understand 
Afghan history better, resource poverty and the absence of European colonial 
rule. In a resource-poor region, the possibility of rapid economic change 
depends to a great extent on the capability and stability of the states; at the 
same time, attempts to create strong centres of power with a weak tax base 
can generate debilitating conflicts. European colonialists in some cases 
managed to overcome the dilemma. In the absence of colonialism, old elites 
and old rivalries survived and intensified the conflict. These two features 
appeared in the histories of many of the world’s poor regions. They shaped 
the process of economic and political change in Afghanistan with great force. 
 
 
1. Introduction: Afghan economic history in South Asian mirror 
Afghanistan has shaped the course of global politics more deeply than many 
regions of the world. It is surprising, then, that the pattern of long-term 
economic change in the country remains a little studied subject. Recent events 
made the country even more remote to the economic historian. Afghanistan saw 
warfare, coup d’état, state collapse, and a shaky recovery in the last 40 years, not 
once but repeatedly. The aftereffects of these tragic episodes continue. The 
disorder of the recent years profoundly impacted the process of economic 
development in the country, fed pessimism about the economy, and created the 
impression that uncertainty was intrinsic to the country’s history. 
 
                                                          
∗ I thank Martin Bayly and Antonio Giustozzi for directing me to some recent and relevant 
works. 
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No doubt turbulent politics contributed to poverty, inequality, and weak 
economic growth in much of Afghanistan in the recent times. Did the disorder 
also disrupt an endogenous long-term process of economic change? Were the 
recent years an aberration in Afghan economic history? Media and popular 
discourses implicitly suggest that they were, by attributing the turbulence to 
external agents like Cold War rivalries or radical Islam. This paper claims to the 
contrary that the disorder was neither an accident nor an externally imposed 
interlude in an otherwise stable course of change, but episodes that belong in a 
much longer and troubled history of state formation. 
 
Economic history suggests that development needs strong states to force market-
integration, design and defend laws, and spend on public goods. But creating a 
strong state is never an easy process. In some environments it was an especially 
challenging process, Afghanistan was one such case. Most of Afghanistan lacks 
enough water for intensive cultivation. States that lived on land taxes were as 
poor as the peasants that they taxed. Although major caravan trade routes 
passed through Afghanistan before the railway age began, the profits 
concentrated in a few cities, which were individually very small before the 
nineteenth century. The country being landlocked with few navigable rivers, 
cheaper forms of trade did not exist. Resource-poverty made states fiscally and 
militarily weak and dependent on the loyalty of regional elites and warlords. One 
manifestation of the weakness was the co-existence of a directly governed zone in 
the better-endowed areas, and a semi-arid periphery that paid a token tribute to 
the centre but was practically independent. 
 
Resource-poverty of this nature characterized much of South Asia. India, for 
example, has even less water on average than does Afghanistan. Along a wide 
band running from West through South to East Asia, imperial states in the 
seventeenth century earned a revenue per head that was ‘puny’ in comparison 
with contemporary states in Western Europe (See discussion in O’Brien 2012, 
and dataset, https://ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH2010articledatabase, 
accessed 18 September 2020). The Mughal or the Ottoman imperial core 
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survived on the back of the military supplies that came from the regions. Their 
hold upon the regions was never totally secure. Most South Asian states in the 
eighteenth century fit this pattern (Roy, 2013). Unlike Afghanistan, the South 
Asian mainland had access to the sea, maritime trade, port cities, irrigable 
deltas and river valleys, and these resources sustained industry, commerce, 
finance, and states. But the extra resources did not create rich imperial states, 
because the seaboard itself was not an integral part of the inland empires. 
 
The British Empire in South Asia that emerged from the end of the eighteenth 
century altered the balance substantially. It did not bring all the periphery 
under direct rule. Nor could it expand the tax base a lot more. But it controlled 
the seaboard firmly. Being a commercially minded and European-origin state, it 
had the unintended effect of weakening traditional institutions like caste and 
feudal loyalties. It created a state less dependent on regional chief than its 
predecessors. By cutting out intermediaries, it could draw more of the taxes 
towards the centre (Roy 2020). That innovation made the core militarily much 
stronger than before. 
 
What did it do with that extra power? Using that power, the state could enforce a 
deep integration of commodity, capital, and labour markets within the territory 
it had control over. The periphery (mainly the princely states) accepted the idea 
of an economic union without resistance. The basis for that acceptance was 
military despotism. Seaboard access, the backing of the Royal Navy, and a 
standing army that the British East India Company raised, built the foundation 
of a military despotism that was new to the region and that defined colonial 
India. The present political map of South Asia, and the enormous armies of India 
and Pakistan, are a legacy of the colonial military despotism. 
 
These ingredients needed for the emergence of a military despotism in a 
resource-poor region were missing in Afghanistan. Although often caught up in 
military contests between Russia and the western powers – the so-called ‘great 
game’ – and forced to lose territories to both, Afghanistan like Iran, Saudi 
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Arabia, or Thailand has never been colonized. The British in India had a 
significant effect on the making of modern Afghanistan, especially in defining 
the region for the world outside (Bayly 2016). The country also became a British 
protectorate in the late-nineteenth century, a fact responsible for the current 
political map and boundaries of the country. However, this influence did not 
change the makeup of the state, nor induce a transition to the military despotic 
model that emerged in South Asia. Because that model did not fully develop, 
indigenous economic and political institutions survived in this region more than 
these did in the rest of South Asia. And because it was resource-poor, the 
governments running the country from Kabul never could impose their writ over 
the entire country. With their mineral resources, arid area states like Iran could 
create a strong central government in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. That 
option was not available to the Afghan state. 
 
These two features, resource-poverty, and a weak centre, made economic 
development a troubled process throughout Afghan history. Any state-led or 
managed development programme would need a robust federal setup. Such a 
structure the country did not have and could not create without running into 
conflicts, even civil war. Therefore, top-down economic modernization policies 
often went badly and raised tensions between the centre and the regions. At the 
very least, the centre had no idea how to bring the regions on board. The last 40 
years of conflicts had owed to many factors, including the Cold War and 
geopolitical rivalries. The fundamental structural element – a perennial tension 
between centralization of power and fragmented power – was another factor. 
Resource poverty made the centre relatively weak, and the task of managing 
economic transformation much harder than otherwise. This, in a nutshell, is the 
story of economic change in Afghanistan. 
 
Presenting modern Afghan history as an unfinished and frequently disrupted 
attempt at making a strong state – and I add a development-capable state – is 
not a new enterprise. Several recent studies of political trajectory done with an 
eye to history offer a similar interpretation (Byrd 2012; Giustozzi 2008). ‘A 
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transition without end,’ is how Giustozzi sums up the story. These studies also 
make the point that placing too much weight upon recent conflicts entails 
missing the unifying forces in Afghan history and overstating the role of ethnic 
differences. The promise of unity lies in ‘leadership’ that could forge coalition 
with regional forces and build a common cause in economic development between 
the centre and the regions. In Byrd’s thinking, the stability of the regime that 
ruled Afghanistan between 1933 and 1973 is a ground for optimism in this 
direction. ‘Afghanistan’s history,’ Byrd says, ‘underlines the importance of 
effective national leadership, both internally and to contain and manage the 
influence of external actors.’ Giustozzi underlines the role of patrimonialism and 
charismatic leaders behind big transitions in modern Afghan history. 
 
None of this is disputable. And yet, this reading of Afghan history is too 
regionally rooted to be useful in doing comparative economic history. Leadership 
is not usually a handy tool to explain long-term economic performance of 
countries, and an awkward one in comparing countries. I add to this general idea 
of a disorderly state-making two ingredients that help us connect politics with 
economic conditions better and can suggest comparisons. These are, fiscally weak 
centre, and partly owing to that structural weakness, the ever-present prospect 
of debilitating competition for power. Much of South Asia in the late-1700s had 
these conditions. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh still ended up with stable 
state structures, and could place these in the service of economic development. 
The colonial legacy facilitated that transformation of state structure. Achieving a 
similar transformation proved consistently more challenging in Afghanistan. 
This is the comparative economic history problem the essay helps us understand. 
The rest of the essay will present a chronological narrative of economic change, 
in relation to political change. 
 
 
2. The emergence of modern Afghanistan 
During much of the twentieth century, Afghanistan was an agricultural country. 
But its agriculture was poorer than the rest of the world’s. According to the 
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World Development Indicator database, in 1961, the average cereal yield in the 
country at 1115 kgs per hectare was 75 percent of the world average. In the next 
60 years, it doubled, much of the increase occurring after 2001. But the world 
cereal yield had increased faster. Afghan yield was half of the world average in 
2017. Agricultural land as a proportion of total land was not small at 58 percent. 
Still, much of the land area, cultivated, arable, or uncultivated, is semi-arid and 
water-poor. There is more renewable water available in the fertile northern 
plains and the river valleys of south and southwest. But the prospect of intensive 
cultivation is not present everywhere, not even within these areas (see Map). 
With population growth, water per head fell to less than a quarter of the world 
average in 2017, despite the launch of large-scale irrigation projects. 
 
Map. Land use 
 
 
At the start of the twentieth century, the main livelihoods in Afghanistan were 
farming and pastoralism. The average peasant was poor, indebted, and exposed 
to the risk of droughts. Agriculture produced a subsistence but was not a road to 
accumulate wealth. Because water for irrigation was available locally in a few 
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regions, land on average did not produce a lot. In large swathes of the country, 
and especially outside the three main river basins, agriculture provided at best a 
subsistence. Since geography did not change, most of the population living on 
land would have lived in the same way in 1900 as they had in centuries past.  
 
About the size of France, Afghanistan is thinly populated. Reliable census did 
not start until the 1980s, though a joint sample survey conducted by an 
American university and the Afghan government in the early-1970s delivered 
useful data (Trussell and Brown 1979). Rough estimates suggest that the 
population was 12 million in the early twentieth century, and around that figure 
as late as the 1970s. The death rate was very high throughout, matched by a 
high birth rate. These number are not reliable. Still, the plausible scenario of a 
demographic inertia reinforces the impression of inertia in livelihoods and the 
high levels of drought and disaster risk. 
 
The picture of immobility needs to be balanced by dramatic movements on the 
political plane. The major towns emerged as seats of political power and centres 
of commerce and crafts sustained by the wealth of the urban elite. However, 
groups that ruled the provinces insisted on autonomy, among other reasons, to 
ensure that their hold over the limited natural resources (like land and pastures) 
remained secure from outsiders. With limited tax resources, and dependence on 
regional ethnic groups, the powers that ruled the capital city had neither the 
military nor the economic might to impose their say upon the entire country. 
Political integration, therefore, was far too difficult a challenge for regimes to 
take on. 
 
Although Afghanistan was never colonized in a proper sense, British power 
played a fundamental role in its emergence as a country. In the early eighteenth 
century, the region did not form one nation or empire. There were three distinct 
political spaces. Herat and Kandahar were under Persian influence, Kabul, 
Ghazni, and Jalalabad in the east were under Mughal imperial influence, and 
the regions in the north were under Central Asian suzerainty. The conquests of 
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Nader Shah (1688-1747), a warlord of Khorasan, and his successor Ahmad Shah 
Abdali (1722-72) brought these regions under a single military command. Kabul 
became the summer capital of the Empire in 1776. 
 
There was little regional integration in government. The opposite, in fact, was 
the case. Against a promise of loyalty, groups and tribal councils that controlled 
the regions were left effectively autonomous. The formation of a dominant centre 
even reinforced their autonomy. Primitive roads and communications ensured 
that long-distance cross-border trade was confined to a few cities and routes. The 
regions retained their livelihoods dependent on local natural resources. The 
broad tribal divisions followed the earlier pattern of political regionalization – 
Turkic groups in the north, Tajiks and Persian-speaking groups in the west, and 
the Afghans or Pashtuns in the east and the centre of the country. 
 
In the early nineteenth century, the Sikh king Ranjit Singh captured the eastern 
territories of the country. From the end of his reign in 1839, the British based in 
India interfered in Afghan politics, taking sides in a contest for power. More than 
the desire to possess territories, a desire to fix the border between India and 
imperial Russia drove the Anglo-Afghan conflict. 
 
Between 1880 and 1901, Abdur Rahman Khan, a friend of the British, was in 
power. Khan was a skilled strategist and succeeded in establishing a military 
dictatorship over much of the territory. In popular history, Khan is sometimes 
projected as a revolutionary ruler and a successful military despotic ruler. A 
contemporary biographer credits him with ‘turning Afghanistan, which before 
his time was a mere barren piece of land full of barbarous tribes, into a 
consolidated Muslim Kingdom and centre of manufactures and modern 
inventions..’ (Khan 1900, I: vii). Abdur Rahman’s autobiography shows that he 
had a more realistic view of his role in history than such hyperbole might 
suggest. 
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He modernized the army with European help and paid the soldiers from the 
central treasury. It was a formidable force only because the rivals were 
disorganized. The army was a small force of about 50,000. The state failed to 
demobilize the regions – ‘the country is full of arms, every man or a woman 
possesses a gun or a sword’ (Khan 1900, II: 57), and they numbered in millions. 
His experiment with industrialization was confined to inviting Europeans to 
produce some military hardware. Although he made some improvements in fiscal 
record-keeping, which was practically non-existent before, he could not raise 
much more money than his predecessors and needed a British subsidy. ‘The only 
drawback,’ he rued time and again, ‘is money, which I am struggling to 
accumulate day and night’ (Ibid. 57-8). He was acutely aware of this weakness, 
dependence on the Europeans, and failure even reluctance to integrate the 
nation: ‘as Afghanistan has not arms enough to fight against any great attacking 
power it would be a folly to allow railways to be laid throughout the country’ 
(Ibid., 60). At Abdur Rahman’s death in 1901, Afghanistan’s status as a British 
protectorate had consolidated. 
 
The protectorate ended in 1919 with the Third Anglo-Afghan war. The war was 
an odd conflict that helped both enemies achieve their objectives. The Afghan 
king Amanullah wrested control of foreign affairs and declared full 
independence, and the British wrested an agreement on the land border between 
Afghanistan and British India. As a military conflict, the war was a small affair, 
with more losses on the Afghan side. World War I had just ended, and the 
British had little appetite for another battle. The USSR took a strong pro-
independence position on Amanullah’s demands. The signs were that an 
independent Afghanistan was a better potential ally to British India than a 
hostile colony. 
 
The effective independence of Afghanistan brought the king face to face with the 
task of building a country and its economy. 
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3. 1919-1945: The beginnings of developmental projects 
From the beginning of the reign of Amanullah Khan in 1919, when a 
modernization programme began, the fractured polity placed the regime in a 
dilemma. Any countrywide development project would require political 
centralization, a move the regions might not want to be a part of. On the other 
hand, if the modernization project did succeed in the areas where favourable 
conditions existed, that would increase the inequality between the capital city 
and surrounding areas and the countryside, even between tribes, and fuel 
discontent. 
 
Khan was a hawk on modernization. His idea about modernization relied on a 
broadly Francophile cosmopolitanism in the capital city, Kabul. He failed, 
however, to sell the idea outside the city. He could not take the regional chiefs on 
board. The Pashtun and Pashtun-influenced areas had a system of periodic 
meetings of tribal chiefs or jirga. In times of national crisis, Afghan kings would 
invite members of the royal family, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders to a grand 
council or jirga in the capital. It is not clear how institutionalized or rule-bound 
these councils were. But it was a distant parallel to a legislative body. 
Amanullah, whose grandfather (Abdur Rahman) had once called the grand 
council for a political reason, wanted to turn this council into a permanent 
legislative body and secure agreement on his more ambitious plans. The move 
failed. 
 
His reign was cut short in 1929, with the rebellion of the Tajik military 
commander Habibullah Kalakani or Bacha-ye Sakao. In popular memory, 
Kalakani is said to have opposed Khan’s secularism. In another view, his 
opposition had more to do with opportunism than ideology. In any case, his was 
one of a series of regional and tribal movements to follow, which underscored the 
military weakness of the government, and its precarious hold on the regions. 
 
The Musahiban royal family that came to power soon after and remained in 
power until 1973 continued the modernization programme on a low key. During 
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the short-lived reign of Muhammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), the regime adopted 
a constitutional monarchy system. The constitution was meant to be an 
instrument for political integration, and a guide to making laws. A Parliament 
based on the tribal council idea would oversee the process and endorse the 
central programmes. Again, these moves failed. With the bureaucracy controlled 
by the court, the legislature had limited room for manoeuvre. The situation did 
not please the regional leaders. There was no real democracy in Afghanistan. 
From this point on and for decades to come, the absence of a party-based 
democracy made securing agreement on the constitution an almost impossible 
task. 
 
At the same time, the economic modernization programme was changing Kabul 
in radical ways. The government opened doors to western experts and advisers. 
In 1932, the Kabul University was established. A programme for mass and 
technical education had been under way for some time, again with the help of 
foreign experts. In 1933, the central bank, Bank-e-Millie was established. In 
1939, a few years into Mohammed Zahir Shah’s rule (reign 1933-73), ministers 
and advisers in the government initiated an industrialization-cum-
modernization programme. 
 
The obstacles were significant. Electric power needed to be produced on a large 
scale, machines for the modern industry had to be imported, finance was 
expensive, managerial skills non-existence, and there were few large private 
enterprises to take the lead. There were promises too. A group of European and 
American engineering firms had claimed that the untapped waters of the Hindu 
Kush rivers could be used for hydro-electric power. In the post-Depression 
revival of trade, it was easy and cheap to procure machines from abroad. And in 
several crafts – brickmaking, metal products, and woodworking – well-developed 
manual skills and knowledge of material were locally available. 
 
The programme soon ran into trouble because of the Second World War. The 
supply of machines stalled, and shortages developed in essential supplies, 
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diverting the government’s attention elsewhere. The government and the central 
bank did largely successful firefighting and managed to save most industrial, 
utility, and service firms with additions to the share capital. As the economic 
rebuilding began, it was found that years of neglect had damaged and 
depreciated scarce assets. Floods had destroyed a part of the building projects 
undertaken before the War. American technology in infrastructure projects did 
not always work. For example, an explosive material did not work too well in 
rock-sand formations. And ‘the Afghans’ working habits and their different 
valuation of human and material resources .. overtaxed even American 
organizational ability,’ wrote Peter G. Franck, a consultant to American firms 
working in Afghanistan (Franck 1949). In Franck’s assessment, political 
disintegration posed the biggest risk to the development project. 
 
The end of the War and the Partition of British India into two countries created 
other problems. Afghanistan’s foreign policy now needed to engage with a 
Pakistan that wanted to create a strong federation by incorporating the Afghan 
semi-autonomous groups living in its territory. The government in Afghanistan 
favoured an openly ‘irredentist’ ideology to advocate a return to autonomy for the 
Pashtun-speaking groups in Pakistan. The relationship between the two 
neighbours was not an easy one, therefore. The border was closed between 1961 
and 1963, upsetting the lives of traders and nomads. 
 
Still, as peace returned, a paradigm of economic development was taking shape 
in the 1950s. 
 
 
4. 1950-1978: The rise and fall of the modernization paradigm 
In part, the paradigm was just another form of the modernization project that 
had begun in the 1920s. But now it was also deeply influenced by economic 
changes happening in the rest of South Asia. A senior minister in 1960 
articulated the sentiment: ‘we do aspire to catch up to our neighbors; because 
failing this, Afghanistan will probably disappear. It will be overwhelmed by the 
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sheer rate of advancement of its neighbors’ (Mohammad Naim Khan, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, cited by Hannah 1979). 
 
Like in the rest of the region, the court and the ministers thought the state 
should get involved in the economic development process. And more acutely than 
in the rest of the country, the Afghan political leaders understood that the 
country needed to keep borders open to capital and skills from abroad. Skills 
shortage was a critical obstacle, not least because the state had more limited 
capacity in Afghanistan than in, say, Pakistan or India. In this way, from a lack 
of choice, the development policy settled on a mixed economy model. 
 
Practically in every country in South Asia, the 1950s was the time for planning. 
Afghanistan was no different. Planning for development was directed from the 
capital city by the political elite and their foreign advisers. But the state had 
serious limits. ‘The narrow base of the fiscal revenue,’ an early critic of Afghan 
planning said, changed the whole meaning of a development plan (Franck 1953). 
The state ‘did not penetrate deeply into the countryside in large parts of the 
country, nor was it very successful developmentally’ (Byrd 2012). Acknowledging 
these limitations, whereas India’s 1956 five-year plan made industrialization the 
target for development policy, Afghanistan’s counterpart made infrastructure the 
goal, rather like in Pakistan and Nepal. The presence of an indigenous business 
class in India and a bigger capacity to capture tax and aid set it apart. 
Afghanistan lacked these initial conditions for industrialization. 
 
The most important field of public investment was the multipurpose river valley 
project. Afghanistan has three major river basins, the Amu Darya Basin in the 
north, the Indus River Basin in the east, and the Helmand River Basin in the 
south. The Helmand Valley project began in 1939 as an Afghan American 
collaboration but did not deliver much benefit. The Nangarhar region on the 
borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan are fed by the Kabul and the Kunar rivers 
and has some of the most fertile agricultural tracts of the country. This area was 
also historically the core commercial zone. Its relatively easy transport access 
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with Pakistan made for a lot of trade between the two countries, centred in 
Jalalabad town. Irrigation in Nangarhar was a focus of Soviet-Afghan 
collaboration. And finally, in Amu Darya (or the old Oxus), the sharing of water 
concerned the USSR and Afghanistan, because the basin was shared. Again, big 
plans emerged to develop the water resources of the basin, followed by little 
action. A second significant area of investment was roads, built mainly with 
American collaboration. Highways linking the cities came up in the 1960s. These 
projects stimulated internal trade as well as trade with neighbours. 
 
Sustaining the developmental impetus was a challenge. Financing a 
development plan that relied heavily on imports was a problem. Where would 
the foreign exchange come from? To pay for concessional loans taken for these 
projects, Afghanistan entered a barter trade collaboration with the USSR. The 
roads and irrigation projects did stimulate the production of Afghanistan’s main 
export articles. But the basket was a limited one, confined to cotton, wool, dried 
fruit, and karakul sheep skin. With the internal market still quite small, foreign 
investors took little interest in the country. Beyond exports and trade in local 
produce, private enterprise had limited room for growth. Governmental capacity 
fell short of the promises made, was perpetually constrained by poor takings, 
bureaucratic corruption, and resistance of regional leaders. 
 
The limited capability of the state made it a weak agent of change in other ways. 
From a historical perspective, the most telling symbol of the limits of the state 
was its failure to establish a legally secure private property right in land. ‘Most 
land ownership and use in Afghanistan,’ writes a 2015 report, ‘has been based on 
informal or customary arrangements that evolved over time. Historically, the 
Afghan state had only a minimal role in land management. Legal title was also 
of little value to most Afghans because the state was too weak to enforce 
property rights beyond urban centers.’ This was the case nearly a century after a 
constitution came into being that sanctioned legislation. Some change had come 
in 1964, when a Department of land Affairs began to create and manage 
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registers of property. Attempts in the 1970s to map private lands and match 
these with titles had little effect beyond the urban areas. 
 
The same story repeated in business law, judicial infrastructure, taxation, and 
credit. In the twentieth century, Afghanistan was an important conduit for trade 
between South Asia and central Asia. Commercial law, however, was embedded 
in informal and local custom of the participants. Again, the constitution gave the 
state the formal authority to pass laws. The laws would not be practically 
enforceable nor widely accepted or understood in the absence of an extensive 
system of courts, which did not appear. As late as the 2000s, ‘fair and reliable 
enforcement of commercial laws through the formal system remains a challenge,’ 
and courts set up in the 2000s struggled to settle disputes without reference to 
customs and practices (Alep – Stanford Law School 2011). Tax collection by the 
central treasury likewise suffered from the extreme decentralization of the 
system. In the prewar years, ‘[f]oreign citizens and firms operating in 
Afghanistan were the only communities that consistently paid their taxes’ (Ibid 
2011: 39). Although a central bank had appeared in 1939 (Da Afghanistan), and 
the 1960s saw banking booms, with a weak legal system, the use of negotiable 
instruments remained restricted. 
 
The drive to create a western-style institutional infrastructure did lead to the 
growth of courts, banks, laws, and firms. Kabul gained the most from that drive. 
The capital city prospered greatly from the modernization of services and 
expansion of government. Between 1954 and 1974, the population of Kabul 
increased from 215,000 to 750,000 (Dupree 1975). On the political level, despite 
the weakness of the party system, democracy was taking root. Several 
Parliamentary seats were open to elections. Students’ movements in 1965 and 
1969-70, and elections in 1971, became occasions when popular political 
sentiment found a platform of expression. 
 
The 1960s saw the beginning of the end of the uneasy equilibrium between 
modernizing Kabul and the semi-autonomous countryside. Rapid economic 
16 
 
growth in the capital city did not have much effect on the average livelihood 
pattern or average incomes. The proportion of population engaged in agriculture 
around 1980 was 85 percent. Per capita income in 1960 was 13 percent of world 
average. There was some catch-up in the 1960s, and a falling-behind over the 
next 15 years (Chart 1). Average income at constant prices for these years are 
not available. The root of the relative, and possibly absolute, slowdown was clear 
enough. The centre did not have the resources to sustain a diversification away 
from agriculture and create enough jobs in industry and services. And whereas 
agriculture did grow, the growth also generated inequality. 
 
Chart 1. GDP per head as a proportion of world GDP per head (%) 1960-1981 
  
Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 18 September 2020). 
 
Three significant changes had happened in the 1960s and the 1970s, with mixed 
results. First, the postwar irrigation schemes, the more recent Green Revolution 
technology, road transport development, and farm mechanization led to 
agricultural growth, migration, and conversion of some nomadic and 
seminomadic groups into farmers. But the whole process was fraught with risks. 
A market for land titles did not exist. Therefore, migration and settlement were 
politically regulated, and frequently led to conflicts. Agricultural growth altered 
the pattern of inequality in parts of the countryside, from a political sort of 
hierarchy cemented by clan loyalty towards less socially acceptable forms of 
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economic inequality. In the 1970s, when reliable statistics on land tenure began 
to be available, a large proportion (40 percent or more) of the rural population 
was landless. In the northern regions, a tiny elite owned much of the land. 
Poverty and inequality now began to reshape the discourse of development in 
Afghanistan, by creating room for a Marxist agrarian reform programme, one 
that promised regulation of credit market and redistribution of land. 
 
In the fragile ecology of the steppe regions, natural resource endowments were 
becoming more insecure for those dependent on small farming and livestock. 
‘Extensive overgrazing, frequent drought, and unwise land-use,’ wrote a survey 
of environmental conditions, ‘have initiated processes of local desertification ..’ 
(Hassanyar 1977). The extent of ‘vegetation deterioration’ was ‘very severe’ in 
southwestern Afghanistan, and areas bordering the southern desert. 
 
The second development was the consolidation of popular political forums. Those 
occasions when public sentiment found outlets revealed deep antipathy towards 
the Kabul elite. The radical left made significant inroads into the university, and 
as the formation of political parties became possible, formed some of the more 
successful ones. The growth of the left movement made the America-dependent 
modernization project less popular than it once was. By the mid-1970s, the open 
doors policy towards the West had its days numbered. 
 
The third area of change was international relations. The USSR was getting 
closely involved with foreign policy, security infrastructure, and developmental 
ideology. A coup-d’état in 1978 brought a coalition of military officers and the 
pro-Soviet radical left into power. The modernizing impulse continued but now 
took on a Soviet face. Soviet engineers replaced the Americans. Soviet military 
experts visited Afghanistan frequently. And through these links, Moscow kept 
itself informed of the inside politics of the Kabul regime. The Soviet Union was 
anxious about the country’s foreign policy mainly because stability in Kabul was 
a key factor in the stability of Central Asia, with which the country shared an 
800-mile border. Ethnic groups that did not feel any reason to commit either to 
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socialism or Kabul-style economic modernization straddled the border. This was 
not Cold War politics for the USSR; it was bound more by geopolitical 
considerations than global military rivalry. But because the USSR was involved, 
the USA and Pakistan became interested in the situation. Whether it could 
afford it or not, Afghanistan was turning into a stage for the Cold War. 
 
The socialist turn served Afghanistan badly. A socialist economic system would 
mean more centralization and not less. The country had neither the fiscal nor the 
military means to carry out more centralization of economic and political power. 
Politically, the rise of the left in Kabul underscored the distance between the city 
and the regions, and the appointment of overbearing leftists in key positions 
angered and upset the regional leaders. The heavily USSR-leaning of Afghan 
radicalism, and dissension within their ranks, did not help matters, even as the 
rise of the communists alarmed the Americans. 
 
The main economic reform programme, a land redistribution project, stumbled 
for a variety of reasons, including the fact that members of the ruling elite were 
out of touch with the regions. The land was of poor quality by and large. The 
officials had little detailed knowledge of who owned which land: ‘It has proved 
more difficult to separate khans and landlords from peasants than Marxist 
analysis had predicted’ (Newell 1979). The move raised a worry about the 
potential consequences of land reforms for ethnic power distribution. USSR was 
a friend of the Afghan communists, but the friendship did not please almost 
anyone else. There were many reasons for the dislike. Ideological differences 
were not the most important of these. One perennial problem was water-sharing 
arrangements in the Amu Darya basin. The USSR often appeared as a bully in 
the negotiations; its commitment was to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. With 27 
percent of the annual flow in its territory, Afghanistan had access to 7 percent of 
the water of the river, according to the Tashkent agreement of 1987. 
 
From late-1978, clashes between the government and the local communities 
erupted in many areas. In 1979, even the cities were living in insecurity. Several 
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powerful militaristic opposition groups emerged to resist central rule. Most 
professed loyalty to the tenets of Islam, but amongst them, there were 
considerable differences over the mix between secularism and religious 
sentiment. In this way, the Afghan civil war that would last for the next quarter 
of a century began. 
 
 
5. 1979-2001: Civil war and state collapse 
The USSR’s military and security apparatus became committed to sustaining 
Afghanistan from early-1979, as the regime threatened to collapse under the 
weight of infighting and a divided military. This phase continued until 1994 
when a little-known movement known as Taliban overthrew the Russia-backed 
government and established a rule. Civil war conditions destroyed a great deal of 
the infrastructure built in the pre-1978 era, killed anywhere between half a 
million to two million Afghan people, left vast areas with unexploded landmines, 
and forced millions to migrate. Aid from the USA, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran 
sustained the rebel groups. The country’s precarious economy was devastated, 
though little estimate exists of the nature and extent of the loss to income and 
property. 
 
Seeing these crucial 15 years in Afghan history as a featureless decline would be 
a mistake, however. Between 1978 and 1994, the cities, especially Kabul, 
continued to benefit from Soviet and Russian contact. One measure of the gain 
was the great number of women who received higher and technical education in 
Russia and returned to occupy key administrative positions. When the Russia-
backed regime fell in 1994, these women, and female education and employment 
more broadly, became a target of fierce Taliban repression. 
 
None of the foreign powers realized, nor cared about, the fact that the Taliban 
embodied an extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism, nurtured in the North 
Western Frontier Province of Pakistan, where the Taliban had their base and 
where the conservative Deobandi ulama had an entrenched position in 
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educational and cultural life. Most Taliban leaders were products of these 
theological seminaries. Despite allegiance to Islam and frequent denial that the 
movement was ethnically biased, the Pashtun dominance of the movement pitted 
them against the other major ethnic groups. 
 
By 1998, without much agency of outsiders, the movement had divided up 
between the mainly Pashtun Taliban, and the Mujahidin formed of Tajik and 
Uzbek ethnic groups. Pakistan backed the former with aid and military help, 
whereas Russia, Iran, and the Central Asian republics supported the latter. The 
USA stayed aloof until 1998 but then joined the attack against the Taliban. It 
had two grievances. After the 1998 bombing of two US embassies in Africa, the 
perpetrator Osama Bin Laden had taken refuge in Afghanistan; and poppy 
cultivation had greatly expanded in the Nangarhar area to give a huge boost to 
opiate production and trade in the world. Almost all the poppy was grown in the 
Taliban areas, and the regime made a good income by taxing the production and 
sponsoring the trade. 
 
The old problems, weak state capacity, and political fragmentation, had returned 
during the Taliban era to disable the regime and made it a weak force for 
economic change of any kind. Political fragmentation returned with a vengeance 
because the revolutionaries were divided and had carved their territories of 
influence and control from the 1980s. After Taliban rise to power, a coalition in 
the north controlled about ten percent of the land area. It was this coalition that 
took over when, in 2001, the American military forces invaded Afghanistan and 
ousted the Taliban. 
 
Although good national income data are not available for the period (the first 
reliable but partial census was conducted in 1979), demographic statistics show 
that the two decades of the 1980s and the 1990s were ‘lost’ times. Afghanistan 
had one of the highest birth rates in the world (47-54 per 1000) in these twenty 
years, and one of the highest infant mortality rates (147-191). With patchy data, 
it is impossible to say if infant mortality rates increased during the turbulence. If 
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it did, that would testify to a collapse of the healthcare system in the 
countryside. Life expectancy at birth was 39-45 years. And Afghanistan was 
losing a big part of its working-age population to migration. 
 
Healthcare took a particularly bad hit from the political turmoil. This setback 
did not owe entirely to the limited financial capacity of the state. The rise of the 
Taliban raised the level of political anxiety among many groups and induced 
heavy migration. Some of the most skilled workers left early and resettled most 
successfully. Among those leaving were many doctors and nurses who went to 
Western European and North American countries. Furthermore, Taliban policy 
to segregate women and remove them from the workforce meant that women 
medical professionals were forbidden from studying medicine and practicing. 
That policy had a devastating impact on maternal healthcare and contributed to 
keeping total fertility rates at a high level (7-8 births per woman).  
 
The end of the civil war and the emergence of a new regime came with the 
promise of a significant turnaround in the demographic history of the country. 
Revival of public healthcare and the return of women to the workforce happened 
almost immediately, with far-reaching impacts. It was a shaky process, 
nevertheless. The earlier high fertility regime meant that in the 2010s, the 
country had a large population of young men and women seeking jobs. In some 
assessments of the country’s future, many of the working-age young people, 
unable to find productive work, took up arms, either on the government’s side or 
the insurgents, thus keeping insurgency alive. To say that the insurgency 
derailed the recovery would be overly pessimistic, but the persistence of 
insurgency does underscore how delicately balanced the economic recovery 
process was. 
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6. 2002-2013: Turnaround 
The last twenty years in the economic history of Afghanistan can be divided into 
two parts. The first part saw more dynamism, and the second part saw some of 
the initial gains lost to a return of civil war conditions. 
 
After the initial recovery from the war, the new government set out to make 
investments again. A significant part of that money came from the Western and 
other donors and went into infrastructure building. A vast number of jobs were 
created in the public sector, mainly in security services. Trade revived. 
Investment in canals and dams increased. Above all, a great deal of money and 
energy went into public healthcare, education, and agriculture. 
 
Health was a priority area, and the one that registered the most gains in a short 
time. The success of healthcare rebuilding showed that money alone was not the 
critical factor in the recovery process. Afghanistan’s open borders to skilled 
people were an attraction for several non-governmental organizations or NGOs 
from India and Pakistan to set up hospitals there. The new facilities employed 
Indian, Pakistani, Afghan personnel trained abroad, and Russian doctors and 
nurses. More than treating diseases, the new infrastructure significantly 
improved immunization systems, which brought some infectious diseases under 
control. Safer water and sanitation projects helped too. 
 
Education was another priority and another area of success. In just a few years, 
over half of the school-going population had enrolled in schools pursuing a 
uniform national curriculum. A third of them were girls, whereas girls’ 
enrolment had fallen to zero in the Taliban controlled areas. NGOs and 
government agencies campaigned successfully for higher recruitment, with 
positive results. 
 
The demographic turnaround was a dramatic one. Between 2000 and 2019, the 
population increased from 22 to 36 million, an average growth rate of 2.5 percent 
per year. Life expectancy at birth improved from 45 to 52 years. The infant 
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mortality rate fell from 147 to 106 per 1000 live births. Net migration was still 
negative and large in the earlier years of the recovery but dropped sharply in the 
later years. These data suggest the prospect of a population explosion, which the 
resource-poverty and civil war conditions could make an impossible challenge for 
any government to deal with. The good news is that in these twenty years, the 
total fertility rate fell so sharply (from 8 to 4.8) that, if the trend persists, the 
population growth rate should fall from 2020, and fall rapidly. Throughout, the 
Human Development Index, and individually measures of health and nutritional 
status and education, improved in the country. And access to water and 
electricity grew at unprecedented rates. 
 
There were other positive changes during the twenty-year recovery.  Major river 
valley projects were taken up especially in the upper Amu Darya basin. 
Urbanization rate speeded up. Urbanization rates reflected increased natural 
growth of population in the cities, thanks to better survival of births. There was 
also migration into the towns, for employment, and education. Much of that flow 
remained Kabul-bound. The gap between Kabul and the second-largest city 
Kandahar widened rapidly, even as migration added pressure to public services 
in Kabul. Overall, the quality of life was significantly better in the cities 
compared with the rural areas.  
 
The initial burst of expenditure produced a healthy growth rate of real national 
income too. South Asia is a good benchmark to compare Afghanistan with. 
Between 2004 and 2013, the average Afghan income as a percentage of South 
Asian average income increased from 35 to 44, and as a percentage of world 
average from 10 to 14 percent.  The catching-up is significant because 
Afghanistan, in 2002, when GDP data began, was the poorest country in South 
Asia. The high growth rate for the next eight years showed not only that the 
foreign donors helped, but also that increasing economic integration through 
trade, migration, and investment with one of the world’s fastest-growing regions 
produced a dramatic outcome in the country. 
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This relative gain disappeared in the next six years, and in 2019, Afghan income 
was again 35 percent of the South Asian one. This was the second part of the 
timespan, one in which there was a steady if mild regress. 
 
 
7. 2013-20: Reversal 
The falling-behind on economic growth was significant. It revealed the three 
pitfalls in the process of recovery. A part of the regress was obviously due to the 
drawdown of international military forces on Afghan soil between 2012 and 
2014, and a drop in related investment and expenditure. But there were also 
deeper structural problems that the recession of the subsequent five years 
revealed more starkly. 
 
First, despite all the help from its security partners, the government in 
Afghanistan remained too weak to integrate the regions under one rule. About 
40 percent of the land area remained outside the regime’s control. Here, opium 
cultivation and drug trafficking continued. ‘Over the course of reconstruction, the 
reports of international organizations and NGOs were replete with tales of 
health-related programs that had to be suspended, canceled, postponed, or 
significantly scaled back because of security issues’ (Jones et al 2006: 207). 
 
Second, the economy did not, and could not, diversify enough. Given the 
resource-poverty of the country, agricultural and industrial development was not 
sustainable avenues of economic development. Insurgency restrained the growth 
of services like tourism and had left a vast army of unemployed youth with 
insufficient training for other services. The public sector remained a large 
employer. Trade, finance, and other commercial services had a boom, but the 
ability of these services to generate more and well-paid jobs depended on there 
being strong production sectors. Overall, the economic growth in Afghanistan 
was services-based, as in the rest of South Asia. However, most services jobs 
were low-paid and insecure, except those in the government. Even the 
government, reports said, paid less to soldiers than did some insurgent groups. 
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And third, poverty remained entrenched, and inequality was on the rise. As on 
many occasions in the past, robust economic growth centred in the cities and the 
fertile agricultural areas, leaving the resource-poor countryside behind. 
Inequality between the countryside and the towns grew wider.  In urban areas, 
‘eight out of ten households had access to improved sanitation in 2013-14, 
compared to only three out of ten in rural households.’ (Afghanistan and World 
Bank, 2017: 8). 
 
Economic growth bypassed the rural poor, whereas insurgency hurt them the 
most. ‘The poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population benefited 
least from [the] growth, and the same groups suffered the most once the economy 
and the security condition deteriorated,’ wrote the 2017 report on poverty cited 
above. United Nations estimates suggest that personal income inequality has 
risen significantly since 2002, a trend common to all countries in South Asia.  
 
A part of the inequality problem was high unemployment rates. The end of wars 
and the initial investment in healthcare paid off in rising population growth, 
which added further pressure to the job market and public services. Youth 
unemployment is at unsustainable levels in the country. In 2013-14, when the 
withdrawal of the forces was at its peak, unemployment rates rose, and ‘one in 
every four people participating in the labor market were either working for less 
than eight hours per week or do not have a job and are actively looking for one’ 
(Afghanistan and World Bank 2017: 7). 
 
Some of the disruptions caused by the 2014 shock wore off in the next five years. 
On the other hand, increased in-migration of former refugees from Iran and 
Pakistan added to the stress, even intensified conflicts in some areas. The return 
of insurgency had a curious effect. As new foreign insurgent groups took 
advantage of the stress, it made the Taliban, now under a different and 
reportedly more moderate leadership, defensive and willing to strike a deal with 
the USA. In 2020, the deal materialized. If successful, and this is still a big if, 
the deal would see the end of military conflict in the areas, mainly the south and 
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the west of the country, where Taliban is powerful. And if successful, it will also 
see an effective secession of these areas from the rest of Afghanistan. Most 
women activists of the country are concerned about a regress in the quality of life 
for the women living in these areas. 
 
Amidst this uncertainty, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the economy hard. 
Compared with the rest of South Asia, the expected drop in national income due 
to working time lost could be smaller in the country, simply because industry 
and services were not doing too well before the crisis and agriculture is on roads 
to recovery from a 2018 drought. In the backdrop of high unemployment and a 
tense security situation, any recession can generate a tremendous amount of 
stress and violence. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The violent history of the country may make us think that Afghanistan is a 
failed state. Far from it. It is not a failed state, but it is a divided state, and the 
root of this division lies in its history and its geography. 
 
For exactly a century, since a state-directed economic modernization drive began 
in Afghanistan, the economy of the country was torn between two forces, 
centralization and fragmentation. A developmental programme designed and 
directed from the capital city could not reach far out to the countryside and the 
provinces. Acute resource poverty, and a tradition of regional autonomy that 
survived because the centre was militarily weak or dependent on local elite, 
made the two worlds fall further apart as the modernization project succeeded. 
The insurgency and civil war of the late-twentieth century were the most recent 
and perhaps the most violent manifestation of the problem. This was a time in 
Afghanistan’s economic history when the centralization force was subdued, and 
fragmentation ruled. The return of a stronger state, albeit with foreign military 
and technical aid, changed the game, but no one will say that it changed the 
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game radically. Economic development has returned, but it has accentuated 
inequality. 
 
There are positive factors. Although it is too early to say, global warming, by 
increasing the snowmelt in the Pamir Mountains, can potentially increase the 
flow in the crucial river of northern Afghanistan, Amu Darya. There are already 
signs that this is happening. It raises the risks of floods (and summer droughts). 
Still, the process holds the prospect of impounding more water for agriculture 
and urban use, with sufficient investment. 
 
Technology has played an ambiguous role. The success of warring groups in the 
country had owed in part to the falling cost of the technology commonly used in 
small-scale warfare. On the hand, the success of the centralizing development-
bound state in recent years owed to improvements in the technology and 
institutions in the service of healthcare and infrastructure. The former factor 
remains a challenge for the modernization project and could lead to a permanent 
if an unofficial division of the country. The latter factor holds much promise. The 
recovery stage saw the construction of assets and institutions that should 
survive if the peace deal does. The future depends on these assets and 
institutions in which the regions have a stake. 
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